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 1 Introduction 
Both Kant and Husserl make reference to ‘transcendental logic’, and this notion plays a 
prominent and distinctive role in their philosophies. However, considering the substantial 
developments in logic since their times, and the concomitant evolution of the common concept 
of logic, one may reasonably ask what the term ‘logic’ means in the expression ‘transcendental 
logic’. In what sense it is a logic, if indeed it is?  
The question can be cashed out as the following: Is ‘transcendental logic’ supposed to be a 
specific branch of logic? Is it intended to develop a particular logical system? Or is it supposed 
to offer a different approach to logic, or, at least, to enrich our conception of logic as such? 
It seems at first glance that ‘transcendental logic’ must be of the third sort. That is, first of all, 
we are to encounter a peculiar conception of logic. However, it is also possible that such a 
conception contains a normative standpoint that endorses a particular logical system, or rather 
contributes to developing such a system: this depends on our delimitation of transcendental logic, 
or rather on the delimitation that transcendental logic proposes for logic as such and the task that 
it accordingly sets for itself within this delimitation. 
In this paper we first examine the phenomenological conception of transcendental logic, and 
then compare it with Kantian conception, discussing the status of transcendental logic as 
compared to formal logic. There is a debate about the proper relation between transcendental 
logic and general logic in Kant’s philosophy, as recently discussed by Tolley (2012). By means 
of our definition of transcendental logic, we will try to offer an appropriate interpretation of 
Kant’s view.  
 
2 Phenomenological conception of transcendental logic 
According to the general phenomenological distinction between act and product, ‘a sharp 
distinction must be made’ between thinking and thought (Husserl 1969: 25). On the one hand, 
we have the activity of thinking – judging, for example – with all its intentional characters as 
well as psychological bindings and, on the other hand, we have thoughts – e.g. judgments – as 
the products of those activities. In the original activity of reasoning, so Husserl argues, we bring 
about as products, not only the consequent judgments but also the patterns of thinking or the 
logical formations (Husserl 1969: 166, 264). Such formations, though produced in the concrete 
activities, ‘transcend the current sphere of presence to consciousness’ (Husserl 1969: 33) and are 
a priori as they are ‘pure from all empeiria’ (Husserl 1969: 29). Thus, those formations, 
considered as ideal products, are genuinely objective. 
Logic, in one sense, seeks to deal with those objective formations in order to elaborate them 
as principles or rules which are to be formal conditions for judgments and inferences. Husserl 
calls this objective logic.
3
 Traditional logic and also modern mathematical logic are then 
objective logics, since they are supposed to deal with the objectification of the laws and rules 
which are functioning in reasoning. Objective logic, or formal logic, takes the rules and 
principles of reasoning as consisting an objective field of study abstracted from any subjective 
act. 
Now, on a higher level, a field of study should be defined which is concerned with the origins 
of the logical issues mentioned above. This studies both the objective and subjective sides of 
logic in their correlation. This discipline is called transcendental logic.  
Husserl says:  
Logic, as the science of all the logical as such and – in its highest form, which 
embraces all other forms of the logical – as the science of all science as such, inquires 
in two opposite directions. Everywhere it is a matter of rational productions, in a 
double sense: on one side, as productive activities and habitualities; on the other side, 
as results produced by activities and habitualities and afterwards persisting. (Husserl 
1969: 33) 
Objective logic, as a study which deals merely with the formations – that is, the results of the 
activities of reasoning – is not concerned with the roots of such formations or the conditions of 
their presence in consciousness. On the other hand, the study of those productive activities would 
belong to psychology if the objective side stayed out of the sight. That is to say, a merely 
subjective logic, which only investigates the subjective, in the sense of the psychological, issues 
involved in reasoning, would not suffice to study the transcendental status of reasoning, which 
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 This term is used by Husserl in a completely different way than as employed by Hegel. Peirce also uses this term in 
his classification of sciences, in a yet different way. See (Peirce 1976: 30). 
should also investigate the constitution of logical objectivities, and thus comprises “sense-
investigations concerning with formal logic” (Husserl 1969: 12). 
The ultimate task of logic, which belongs to the transcendental, two-sided logic, is described 
by Husserl as follows: 
[W]ith a continuously two-sided research (results on either side determining inquiries 
on the other), logic must go back systematically from the ideal formations to the 
consciousness that constitutes them phenomenologically; it must make these 
formations understandable, in respect of their sense and their limits, as essentially 
products of the correlative structures of productive cognitive life … . The ideal 
Objectivity of the formations with which logic is concerned – like the real world – is 
in no way altered in the process. (Husserl 1969: 263) 
In order to explain what is sketched above, which is based on Husserl’s arguments in Formal 
and Transcendental Logic (Husserl 1969), the following can be offered which puts together ideas 
from throughout Husserl’s works. Pure logic is the theory of science in general (Husserl 2001: 
16). To the idea of science in general “belongs, first of all, an initial clarification of ‘judicative’ 
doing and the ‘judgment’ itself, along with the discrimination of immediate and mediate 
judgments” (Husserl 1960: 10). “Mediate judgments, the conclusion of an inference, for 
example, are results obtained from grounds which themselves refer back to immediate cognition” 
(Husserl 1973: 24). A main concern of science is to ground mediate judgments on the basis of 
immediate judgments (Husserl 1960: 10). Thus the theory of science in general, detached from 
the particular contents with which judgments of any science deal, concerns itself with the 
conditions of such a grounding. If all judgments we could have were immediate or intuitive, in 
the phenomenological sense of the term, there would be no room for mediate grounding, that is, 
for reasoning, and thus no logic could be brought about. In fact, in such a case no science, or at 
least no eidetic science, could exist and a fortiori no theory of science would be possible. For 
example, if all we knew about the relation between numbers were as immediately conceived as is 
the case for the few first ones, “there would be no arithmetic, for it would then be completely 
superfluous” (Husserl 2003: 201). 
But how does the grounding of a mediate judgment on the basis of immediate ones work? A 
distinctive kind of grounding is the one based on the forms of the judgments involved. Forms of 
judgments, as ideal entities, are objective in their own right. Where logic deals with such forms 
in order to establish certain kinds of grounding – above all, deduction, in which the relation of 
grounding is a necessary one – it should be called formal logic. Formal logic, in dealing with the 
objective forms of judgments and disregarding the constitutional root of those forms in 
subjective acts of reasoning and judicative doing, is called by Husserl objective logic.  
However, logic as such is not restricted to formal relations. If logic is to deal with reasoning, 
that is, a certain kind of grounding of knowledge (Erkenntnisbegründung) then it primarily has to 
study all kinds of mediate grounding. It is not the case that any grounding as such has to wait for 
a reasoner to entertain some preconceived formal rules of grounding. Such formal rules are 
obtained by the thinking subject from certain primordial acts of reasoning. Just as the categorial 
forms of judgment themselves may be grasped or constructed by the thinking subject in this or 
that manner (that is, either by ideation or categorial intuition or by categorial synthesis),
4
 one 
may discern the formation involved from within the originary reasonings. In a higher act, the 
thinking subject can examine whether those formations have any role in the grounding of the 
judgments attained. That is, the thinking subject may identify the patterns of reasoning which 
can be abstracted from the content and yet constitute such a connection between forms of 
judgment that can be a ground for conclusive reasoning. Such a move must of course be subject 
to a critical examination, which is not to recall some predetermined, objective criteria but to 
explore certain peculiar acts of subjectivity. Therefore a field of study, in regard to judgment 
grounding or reasoning in general, is opened which is essentially a self-investigation of the 
transcendental subjectivity. This is what is called by Husserl transcendental logic.  
A further explanation about the notion of grounding may be helpful to clarify the nature of 
transcendental logic. For Husserl every cognition must be grounded. What is not directly 
grounded in evidence must be mediately so grounded and all must finally rest upon apodictic 
grounds. Moreover, “absolute grounding of cognition is possible only in the all-embracing 
science of transcendental subjectivity, as the one absolute existent” (Husserl 1969: 271). Now 
not only must any mediate judgment be grounded on some supposedly evident judgment, which 
its formulation is the task of formal logical, logic itself must be grounded finally in 
transcendental subjectivity. This subjective ground of logic is to be clarified by the self-
examination on the part of transcendental subjectivity and the specific discipline so defined is 
called transcendental logic.  
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 We explain these notions further in section 4. 
It is worth mentioning here that although any logical knowledge must finally rest upon 
apodictic grounds, apodicticity does not entail infallibility (Husserl 1969: 156). Or, as David W. 
Smith (2004: 54) puts it, the phenomenological character of apodicicity, that is, indubitability, 
should not be confused with the ontological character of infallibility.   
3 The status of transcendental logic in Kant 
What has been explained above is indeed very similar to Kant’s conception of transcendental 
logic:  
It [i.e. transcendental logic] would therefore concern the origin of our cognitions of 
objects in so far as that cannot be ascribed to the objects; while general logic, on the 
contrary, has nothing to do with this origin of cognition, but rather considers 
representations, whether they are originally given a priori in ourselves or only 
empirically, merely in respect of the laws according to which the understanding brings 
them into relation to one another when it thinks, and therefore it deals only with the 
form of the understanding, which can be given to the representations wherever they 
may have originated. (Kant 1998: A55-6, B80) 
However, there are some issues that make it difficult to give an indisputable interpretation of 
Kant’s transcendental logic. This is due, above all, to the fact that very fundamental problems are 
discussed by Kant under the title of transcendental logic. As is clear from the above quotation, 
unlike Husserl for whom both formal and transcendental logics are concerned with ‘formations’5, 
the former dealing with them as objects and the latter dealing with their constitution in 
consciousness, Kant brings in more general problems concerning the origin of the ‘cognition’ of 
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 As an exemplary evidence that for Husserl “formation” is the central theme of logic, either formal or 
transcendental, we may bring the following quotation: 
The formations with which logic is concerned and their universal forms are given at first in a 
straightforward evidence; and this comes first necessarily. But now [i.e. in transcendental logic] a 
thematizing reflection on this evidence is demanded: a reflection, that is, on the formative activity, which 
has heretofore been carried on straightforwardly and naively, without becoming a theme. The formations 
and universal forms (formations belonging to a higher level), which are "given" in the activity and are at 
first, all that is "given", must now be "clarified" reflectively in order that, by clearing up the intentionality 
that aims at and actualizes its objective sense originaliter, we may rightly apprehend and delimit this sense 
and secure its identity against all the shiftings and disguisements that may occur when it is aimed at and 
produced naively. (Husserl 1969: 176) 
Therefore, although Husserl’s transcendental logic, just like Kant’s, deals with the problem of “origin”, it  
characteristically focuses on the origin of formations. The basic difference, however, is that those formations for 
Husserl are genuine objects while this is not the case for Kant. We discuss more about this point in the next sections. 
objects. The greater part of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason falls under the title ‘transcendental 
logic’. In addition, in certain places of his work, Kant gives definitions for transcendental logic 
which may, at least at first sight, to seem in tension to each other. Historically there have been 
two main interpretations of Kant’s account of transcendental logic and its relation to general 
logic.  
Some commentators on Kant, based on certain textual evidence, defend the view that 
transcendental logic should be distinguished from general logic by the new domain that it opens. 
Whereas general logic deals with analytic judgments, transcendental logic has as its scope the 
species of synthetic judgments. Tolley (2012) calls this view domain-exclusive. As he observes, 
such an interpretation is defended by Friedrich Ueberweg (1874), Hermann Cohen (1885), and 
Norman Kemp Smith (1918). Notable evidence for this view comes is the following quotation:  
The explanation of the possibility of synthetic judgments is a problem with which 
general logic has nothing to do, indeed whose name it need not even know. But in a 
transcendental logic it is the most important business of all, and indeed the only 
business if the issue is the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments and likewise the 
conditions and the domain of their validity. For by completing this task transcendental 
logic can fully satisfy its goal of determining the domain and boundaries of pure 
understanding. (Kant 1998: A155, B194) 
Other commentators, pointing to other textual evidence, hold the view that transcendental 
logic, studying only synthetic a priori thinking, is a branch of general logic which concerns all 
thinking. Such a view has been argued for by H. J. Paton (1936, 1958). Tolley calls this the 
domain-subordinative view. As an example of a quotation to support such a view we may 
mention the following:  
[T]ranscendental logic … has to do merely with the laws of the understanding and 
reason, but solely in so far as they are related to objects a priori and not, as in the case 
of general logic, to empirical as well as pure cognitions of reason. (Kant 1998: A58, 
B81-2) 
Both of those views try to delimit transcendental logic by means of its domain or scope. 
However, if we characterize transcendental logic in the way presented above we might see that 
the disagreement between the interpretations is based rather on the ambiguity of the concept of 
the domain while speaking of logic. We will discuss this point in the following, and hence argue 
for the view that Kant’s conception of transcendental logic is in its essence the same as the 
Husserlian conception explained above. The differences between Kant’s and Husserl’s account 
can be specified once the common conception is grasped. We will examine those differences in 
the next section.  
Any science normally has its own subject matter, that is, a domain of objectivity about which 
it is supposed to give knowledge. Logic as a science has an extra feature: it is supposed to be 
applied in domains of objectivity. Logic may be used as a tool, though not a productive one, in 
the course of seeking knowledge. In this sense it is relevant to speak about the topics in thinking 
and reasoning about which a logic is useful or usable. Therefore, while speaking about the object 
of logic we should distinguish between two things: a domain of objectivity about which a logic is 
to give knowledge, and a domain on which a logic may be applied. Let’s call the former the 
subject matter and the latter the domain. 
General logic as a negative tool seems to give no objective knowledge. However, since 
general logic’s being conditio sine qua non, according to Kant, ultimately rests upon the 
principle of non-contradiction, which is ‘the universal and completely sufficient principle of all 
analytic cognition’ (Kant 1998: A152, B192), it is also capable of giving knowledge about 
analytic cognitions, that is, it is also to produce analytic judgments. As Kant says:  
[I]f the judgment is analytic, whether it be negative or affirmative, its truth must 
always be able to be cognized sufficiently in accordance with the principle of 
contradiction. (Kant 1998: A152, B191) 
Therefore, general logic is not completely without subject matter: rather, its subject matter is 
analytic cognition. Its domain, on the other hand, is any objectivity whatsoever. If general logic 
is employed as it should be in general, that is as a negative tool, or as Kant puts it as a canon not 
as an organon, it can be applied everywhere. 
The subject matter of transcendental logic, as the structure of Critique of Pure Reason shows, 
is the functions of understanding and reason and their principles – and this includes also the 
principle of non-contradiction. Transcendental logic thus gives knowledge about the origins of 
both analytic and synthetic judgments. Therefore, in respect with the subject matter, general 
logic is subordinated to transcendental logic. However, as a task of study, the origin of synthetic 
judgments is much more important for transcendental logic. For this reason the proponents of the 
domain-exclusive view are justified in emphasizing that transcendental logic deals with synthetic 
cognitions and general logic with analytic ones. Nevertheless, it is wrong to state that their 
subject matters are mutually exclusive. As is clear from the aforementioned quotation, Kant says 
that ‘The explanation of the possibility of synthetic judgments … in a transcendental logic is the 
most important business of all’; the most important business, not the only one. It is the ‘only’ 
business only when ‘the issue is the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments’ (Kant 1998: 
A155, B194). Then transcendental logic also deals with the possibility of analytic judgments and 
their origin, but since this is not as problematic as synthetic judgments, and also because there is 
already a formal system, a complete one in Kant’s eyes, dealing with it, a little part of 
transcendental logic is dedicated to it.  
The domain of transcendental logic is, however, very restrictive. If one wants to use the 
methods of transcendental logic to draw out a piece of knowledge, one should have in mind that 
it is applicable only to a priori cognition. Properly speaking, transcendental logic deals with 
originations not with the objective consequence relations. Yet if logic is used as a propaedeutic, 
general logic is unrestricted in its domain and it is propaedeutic to all use of the understanding in 
general, while transcendental logic is connected only to the pure a priori cognition (Kant 1992: 
530). Then there is a sense in which the domain of transcendental logic is subordinated to that of 
general logic. Therefore, the domain-subordinative view is not totally groundless. However, 
transcendental logic should not be characterized by its domain since it is not specified by its 
domain of objectivity but above all by its subject matter, which is so fundamental that is at work 
in every cognition of objects. 
Kant says:  
In a transcendental logic we isolate the understanding … and elevate from our 
cognition merely the part of our thought that has its origin solely in the understanding. 
(Kant 1998: B87) 
This may suggest that in transcendental logic we do not deal with any thinking whatsoever, but 
only with one kind of it, and thus transcendental logic is not general. But we should notice that 
Kant says that in transcendental logic we deal with a particular part of our thinking, while this 
part may be present in every judgment and indeed it is. So, the fact that the domain of 
transcendental logic is restricted in a sense does not mean that it is not general.  
Tolley (2012) argues that the difference between transcendental logic and general logic is not 
a matter of domain but one of aspect. Accordingly, he states that transcendental logic is as 
general as general logic; this is true, as we just tried to explain. We are in agreement with Tolley 
that the difference between transcendental logic and general logic should be sought in terms of 
aspect rather than domain. However, we shall disagree with his proposal on what aspects are to 
characterize each one of those logics. The difference of the aspects that he suggests is based on 
the difference between form and content. He links general logic with the form and transcendental 
logic with ‘the content of thinking and judging, albeit in a very abstract manner’. An apparent 
problem may arise here, which Tolley himself mentions and tries to resolve, if we understand the 
form/content distinction in the way Kant himself uses it. For Kant, form is what is introduced by 
understanding while content is given in intuition. In other words, form is intelligible whereas 
content is sensible. Of course it would be quite wrong to say that transcendental logic concerns 
the sensible. Tolley made it explicit that here the form/content distinction should be regarded as 
both belonging to the conceptual side of cognition
6. In this sense he speaks of content ‘in a very 
abstract manner’. However, another problem would arise here, which Tolley does not point out. 
A usual way of conceiving of the distinction between content and form as regards conceptual 
cognition is to see the categorial articulation of the cognition as form and its constituting parts 
(which might be articulated in this or that manner) as content. This is in connection with what 
was known from the medieval era as the distinction between matter and form in logic. In this 
view, the form of a judgment is made up of its syncategorematic parts. Its matter is its purely 
cetegorematic terms. We find such a definition, for example, in Buridan (2015: 74), who says 
that in the judgment “all humans are mortal”, for example, “all … are” and thus “all” and “are” 
constitute the form of judgment, whereas “human” and “mortal” are meanings which provide the 
content of judgment. Here we are concerned with “conceptual content”, as Tolley calls it, and he 
shows convincingly that it was an important theme for Kant. However, the problem is how we 
can say that transcendental logic solely concerns itself with the conceptual content of cognition 
so that the issues of form remain outside of its scope? If the difference between form and content 
is what is supposed to characterize general and transcendental logic in contrast to each other, 
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 In our examination of Tolley’s argument, we shall leave the discussion on the distinction between the conceptual 
and the non-conceptual in the sphere of cognition. This is a very important topic in its own right. However, we may 
mention, in passing, that Husserl’s theory of noema deals with the problems pertaining to this topic, and, although 
there are different interpretations of noema, it can be said that the "noematic" in Husserl is broader than the "conceptual" in 
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then if the issues of form pertain to general logic they should be excluded from the task of 
transcendental logic. But we frequently see in Kant that transcendental logic is to deal with the 
origin of cognition, which of course includes its form, and also that transcendental logic is to 
explain the possibility of synthetic judgments and thus not only their conceptual content but also 
their form. Above all, the parallelism so rightly stressed by Tolley between forms of judgment, 
dealt with in general logic, and the table of categories, would be lost if we render the distinction 
between general logic and transcendental logic as equivalent to the distinction between 
syncategormatic and categorematic terms. Indeed, in the table of categories we still deal with 
forms, but here as originated in the transcendental subjectivity. We find Tolley’s content/form 
argument unconvincing, because in transcendental logic too we deal with the forms of judgment, 
particularly with the statuses and the origins of those forms. The distinction, as our explanation 
in the previous section shows, is that in general, formal logic we deal with the forms as objective, 
and in transcendental logic we deal the transcendental-subjective ground of the same forms.  
If the delimitation of logical studies given in the previous section is taken into account, most 
of tensions concerning the proper interpretation of Kant’s conception of transcendental logic 
would be resolved. It will be clear that transcendental logic is neither a specific part of logic nor 
is it to be a system of logic focusing on a domain other than that of formal logic. Rather, it 
introduces a new conception of logic, or to put it better, it explores a higher perspective toward 
the logical elements and the associated problems so that although the general logic may remain, 
in Kant’s eyes, unaltered, our understanding of its nature would be radically changed. Then, 
transcendental logic need not be a new part or an alternative system designed to say something 
about logic. It concerns the origins, and in this sense it is already on a different level than that of 
general logic.  
Yet the question of whether from this perspective we have only a descriptive stance toward 
the objectivities formulated in general logic, or also a prescriptive stance, which provides some 
criteria to revise, or at least evaluate, general formal logic, remains a matter of debate. Kant 
explicitly takes the former position, whereas Husserl’s view is at least open to the latter position. 
The reason for this rests upon a very basic difference between Kant and Husserl, discussed in the 
following section. 
4 The difference between Kant’s and Husserl’s views 
In the about one century distance between Kant and Husserl, formal logic had been developed 
extensively
7
 and especially Husserl wrote in the era of intensive developments in modern logic. 
However, Husserl’s account of transcendental logic already stands apart from that of Kant. In 
what follows I discuss the main point of difference. 
For Kant, intuition is restricted to the sensible. Therefore the ultimate formations of 
judgments, namely the categories, being formations which originate in the understanding and 
thus are not intuitable, need to be validated by a particular method which is called 
‘transcendental deduction’. The objective validity of the categories cannot be grounded in direct 
experience, that is, in what Kant calls ‘empirical deduction’ (Kant 1998: A86, B118). 
Accordingly, such transcendental deductions are ‘once and for all’. In the discovery of 
categories, the forms of judgment as already formulated in general logic may serve as clues and 
in turn the transcendental deduction may grant the validity of those formations. Once such 
validity is granted, there is no room for alteration – unless we find we had committed an error. 
Kant speaks of a list of categories which is to be explored once. Thus general logic, if correct – 
that is, if its forms are coincident with the a priori concepts of understanding – is complete. In 
other words, there is no place in Kant’s philosophy for “the critical view of logic”, as it is also 
recently discussed by Hartimo (2019)8. Whereas Kant’s critical philosophy is to study 
conditions of the possibility of experience, which are at the same time conditions of the 
possibility of the objects of experience (Kant 1998: A112), logic and logical entities are not 
considered by Kant as proper objects of experience and thus no critical view is aimed at them. 
For Husserl such exclusion is unjustified. It can be said that if “critical” view, in the Kantian 
sense of the term, is developed accurately to cover also logic, it leads to “transcendental logic” in 
the Husserlian sense of the term. Nevertheless, as we will see, it is not an accidental feature of 
Kant’s philosophy not to extend its critical view in this direction.  For Husserl, the intuition may 
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 Sometimes it is said that modern logic was born in 1879 by Frege’s work. But one should not overlook Peirce’s 
works at the same time, and the groundbreaking works of Boole and Bolzano before them, not to mention other 
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 Our analysis here about the difference between Kant’s and Husserl’s take on logic is basically in accordance with 
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(and thus formal ontology) and shows the main discordances of Husserl and Kant, whereas we here try to show the 
divergences only focusing on the relation between formal logic and transcendental logic. The relation between logic 
and ontology is a significant theme of Husserl’s phenomenology dealing with which is beyond the task of this paper. 
also be extended to the categorial forms. The categories, as discussed below, can be grasped 
through experience. Accordingly, although Husserl speaks of certain categories
9
, he does not 
consider a central task of philosophy to offer, a priorily, a closed list of categories; rather what 
should be pursued is to study categorial acts and especially categorial synthesis.
10
 As we will 
see, these are important points which affect the analysis of the relation between the 
transcendental and formal logics.  
To have a clear idea of the difference between Kant’s and Husserl’s views on logic, we may 
first quote Kern, who in his outstanding work Husserl und Kant dedicates a chapter to the idea of 
logic. He states:  
Kant’s explanation that the Reason in formal logic does not deal with the objects, but 
only with itself, is a false explanation according to Husserl, if he understands the 
expressions in his own senses. The ‘meanings’ in the apophantics, as well as 
‘something’ in mathematics, are for him objects in the true sense of the word. 
Whereas, if he reads Kant’s explanation in the Kantian sense, where ‘object’ means 
only a really existent object, he could agree with Kant. (Kern 1964: 139) 
That Husserl considers logical forms to be genuine objects and accordingly extends the scope 
of intuition up to the categories, whereas Kant does not, reflects the difference in their views on 
the status of intuition. Kant makes a contrast between intuition and understanding, and thus the 
categories, or the most general concepts belonging to the realm of understanding, fall outside of 
the scope of intuition. For Husserl the notions of intuition and understanding are not defined in 
this Kantian way. The notion of intuition is explained in terms of the fundamental concept of 
intentionality. Since every conscious act is intentional, Husserl introduces the notion of intuition 
in connection to the direct fulfillment of the intention. An intention may be unfulfilled and intend 
object in a way which Husserl calls signitive (Husserl 2001: 710). Otherwise, it may be already 
fulfilled. In this case we have an intuitive intention. Accordingly, two kinds of fulfillment should 
be distinguished: in the static union of intuition the intention is already fulfilled, while in the 
dynamic union of intuition there is a primary distance between an empty intention and the 
fulfilling experience. Even in the case in which the intention is already fulfilled, an empty 
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 For a thorough study on the system of Husserlian categories see (Smith 2013). 
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 He explores those notions, most importantly, through the sixth investigation of Logical Investigations (Husserl 
2001) and in section 9 of Ideas II (Husserl 1988). 
intention can be grasped by means of empty-modification
11
. To the side of intention belongs 
categorial articulation of an experience in contradistinction with its ‘receptive givenness’. 
Categorial articulations are brought about by spontaneous acts of subjectivity, in contrast to 
receptivity, and belong to a new kind of objectivity (Husserl 1973: 198-9). Categorial 
objectivities are called by Husserl objectivities of understanding
12
. Therefore, according to 
Husserl, understanding is related to having an empty intention regardless of its possible content. 
In other words, to have understanding is to have access to meaning, or to the meaning-based 
essence
13
 of intention, independent of the actual access to the possible intuition corresponding to 
that intention.  
Now, as intuition is constituted in connection to the direct fulfillment of intention, we may 
investigate if it is plausible to speak of the intuition of the ideal, including the categories. Since 
the ideal objects are objectified, as it should be, by some intentions, and those intentions are in 
these cases fulfilled as the moments inherent in the categorial experience (that is, the experiences 
in so far as they are categorially articulated, or more simply the experiences with conceptual 
content), then we are able to speak of the intuition in the case of the ideal objects. The fulfillment 
of the intentions toward the ideal cannot be reduced to some sensuous elements, thus they are 
fulfilled exactly as the fulfillment of categorial intentions, hence the idea of categorial intuition 
(Husserl 2001: 803). 
Such a fulfillment is primarily a moment within the conceptual experiences. However, in a 
higher act such a moment can be reflected upon (Husserl 2001: 815). In this case we will have a 
particular sense of categorial intuition, which is the intuition of categories, or of the ideal. This is 
a delicate point and we cannot here go into the details.
14
 However, we may say in passing that for 
Husserl the categorial forms are possibly given in experience in a way analogous to common 
sensuous intuition (Husserl 2001: 784). A central case of categorical intuition is ideation or 
essence-seeing (Wesenschau). As an example of ideation consider the judgment “there are two 
green tables”. Provided that the color green and the shapes of the tables are given through sense-
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 Leermodifikation. See (Husserl 2002: 96)  
12
 Verstandesgegenständlichkeiten. A chapter of Experience and Judgment is dedicated to explain the constitution of 
objectivities of understanding (Husserl 1973: 237-271) 
13
 Bedeutungsmäßigen Wesen. See E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, Zwiter Band, I. Teil. (Husserl 1913: 150, 
417, 436). 
14
 For the literature on the adequate understanding of categorial intuition, see (Tugendhat 1967), (Sokolowski 
1974:34–42), (Sokolowski 1981), (Lohmar 2002), (Lohmar 2006), (Hopkins 2011), (van Atten 2015b), and (Shafiei 
2018: 118–138). 
perception, what brings about the notion of “two”? Husserl shows, in the Prolegomena and 
elsewhere, the flaws of the theory of abstraction as to explain the origin of ideal concepts. In his 
theory of ideation Husserl explains that how ideal concepts, including also certain logical 
connectives, are obtained within an experience by means of some specific acts. Therefore, ideal 
objects are objects in their own right and can be investigated by means of appropriate eidetic 
experiences.  
The ultimate disagreement of Kant and Husserl about formal logic here shows itself. Husserl 
says that Kant’s position largely involves a reaction to Hume and other empiricists. But via such 
a reaction, however elegant it is, certain prejudices have found their way into Kant’s philosophy. 
One of those prejudices is the overlooking of ideal objects as genuine objects. Husserl says:  
The eighteenth century and the age that followed were so strongly actuated by 
empiricism (or better, by anti-Platonism) that nothing was remoter from them than 
recognition of ideal formations as being objectivities – in the manner and in the good 
and never-relinquishable sense whose legitimacy we have established in detail. 
(Husserl 1969: 258) 
Having failed to notice the objectivities peculiar to formal logic, Kant ‘asked no transcendental 
questions about formal logic, but rather ascribed to it an extraordinary apriority, which exalts it 
above such questions.’ But how could such negligence on the part of Kant have taken place?  
How does it happen that he [i.e. Kant] regards a formal logic, with its apriority, as 
self-sufficiently grounded? How is it comprehensible that he never thought of asking 
transcendental questions about the sphere of formal logic, taken as a sphere in and for 
itself? That can be understood as a consequence of the above-mentioned dependence 
on Hume implicit in Kant’s reaction against him. Hume directed his criticism to 
experience and the experienced world, but accepted the unassailableness of the 
relations of ideas (which Kant conceived as the analytic Apriori). Kant did the same 
with his counter-problem: He did not make his analytic Apriori a problem. (Husserl 
1969: 260) 
As a consequence of the empiricists’ and Kant’s attitude, no fundamental investigation into 
the origin of formal logic was undertaken. According to Husserl:  
That was because no one ventured, or had the courage to venture, to take the ideality 
of the formations with which logic is concerned as the characteristic of a separate, 
self-contained, ‘world’ of ideal Objects and, in so doing, to come face to face with the 
painful question of how subjectivity can in itself bring forth, purely from sources 
appertaining to its own spontaneity, formations that can be rightly accounted as ideal 
Objects in an ideal ‘world’. (Husserl 1969: 260) 
This latter sentence, as we have mentioned before, is the principal question of transcendental 
logic for Husserl. So, the main difference between Kant and Husserl is that Husserl emphasizes 
the objectivity of ideal formations so that the task of transcendental logic is to investigate those 
objectivities and to unveil their genesis and the truths about them. Thus the origin and the 
validity of formal logic are to be explored by transcendental logic. Transcendental investigations 
will provide us with the criteria to assess or possibly to revise a given formal logic. If we found 
no ground for the validity of a logical formation in our transcendental-intentional experience, no 
transcendental argument, in the Kantian sense, can be helpful: such a formation should be put 
aside from formal logic or it should be restricted in a proper manner.  
Therefore, formal logic, formulating the ideal relations between some categorial forms, not 
only is devised in order to be applied in the course of knowledge but also is the representation of 
the knowledge about certain ideal objects.
15
 The investigations pertaining to transcendental logic 
lead Husserl to distinguish three levels of formal logic (Husserl 1969: 48-55): 
1. Pure morphology of judgment  
2. Logic of consequence  
3. Logic of truth  
The logic of consequence, which formulates the analytic consequence relation, is also called 
the logic of non-contradiction. That Husserl also adds the first and the third level to formal logic 
besides the level of non-contradiction, which seems to be equal to Kant’s conception of general 
                                                        
15
 One may note here that for Husserl the formality of formal logic does not mean that it is devoid of any content. In 
this regard, Husserl’s account of formal logic is in agreement with that of Frege. MacFarlane (2002), in his thorough 
study of Frege’s conception of logic in comparison to that of Kant, says: 
[L]ogic, for Frege, cannot abstract from all semantic content: it must attend, at least, to the semantic 
contents of the logical expressions, which on Frege’s view function semantically just like non-logical 
expressions. And precisely because it does not abstract from these contents, it can tell us something about 
the objective world of objects, concepts, and relations, and not just about the “forms of thought.”  
logic, should be clear from the above explanations about the objectivity of logical forms. If 
logical forms are genuinely objective we may speak about truths concerning them, not only the 
truths for which they are supposed to serve as forms. Kant would assign no place for the logic of 
truth in his general logic, for he does not consider logical forms as Objects, and so to speak about 
them would not be legitimate except by means of the transcendental argument (in the Kantian 
sense of the term).  
Since a main point of divergence between Husserl and Kant, as just explained, is their account 
about the objectivity of the ideal, questions will arise about the exact nature of the ideal objects 
and their ontological status in Husserl. The answer lies in Husserl’s theory of meaning which 
itself depends on his theory of intentionality. Therefore we need to have a brief survey on this 
matter before concluding our discussion. Of course this is itself a vast topic and no 
comprehensive treatment is possible here. We only outline below the main points which are 
directly relevant to our argument.
16
 
5 Logic and theory of meaning 
It may be inferred from Husserl’s triple distinction of the levels of formal logic, mentioned 
above, that, since it includes logic of truth, Husserl’s account of formal logic already 
encompasses a form of semantics. This is true, but it only expresses one side of the matter.  
Logic, as said above, concerns truth in two senses. One is the question regarding the truth of 
propositions consisting a logical inference. This is the question with which semantics is to deal.
17
 
From the phenomenological point of view truth of propositions should be explained in terms of 
intentionality, that is, as a relation of fulfillment between some sorts of intentions (here of the 
propositional form) and what fulfill them. Husserl developed a full-fledged theory for such a 
relation already in his Logical Investigations. The other possible sense is the question regarding 
the truths of logical principles, here considered not as tautologies in the sense of devoid of any 
content. If ideal objects, including logical forms, are proper objects, then there are intentions 
toward them which may be fulfilled or not, that is, it would be relevant to ask about the truth of 
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 For a recent and detailed analysis of the phenomenological theory of meaning and intentionality see (Shafiei 
2018). 
17
 This formulation would be appropriate only for model-theoretic semantics. For other frameworks some 
modifications are needed.  
statements about logical forms: they are not only supposed to be truth-preserving but must be 
true themselves. 
For Kant, transcendental logic comprises a logic of truth (Kant 1998: A62-3/B87) as is the 
case for Husserl. The difference is that, by distinguishing the truth level of formal logic, Husserl 
highlights a link between formal logic and transcendental logic which can be seen as constituting 
another locus for the normative standpoint of transcendental logic toward formal logic. In the 
other words, formal logic for Husserl is not an autonomous enterprise whose validity lies only on 
its self-consistence. Rather it owes its authenticity to the transcendental sense-investigations 
pertained to it. This method of sense-investigation (Besinnung) is essential for any science; and 
logic is no exception
18
. Indeed this question is much more significant for logic for its being the 
general theory of science.   
Logical objects are in need to meaning clarification; their constitution as ideal objects, as 
dependant or independent meanings, must be made explicit by means of transcendental 
investigations. Truths about them, i.e. logical principles, should be drawn from those 
investigations; or the received principles must be thus reevaluated. The constitution of meaning, 
according to phenomenology, depends on intentionality. In order to grasp the aforementioned 
ideas regarding the relationship between formal logic and truth, it is essential to keep in mind 
that Husserl would not admit any kind of truth-theoretical theory of meaning. This point has been 
discussed elsewhere (Shafiei 2018 and 2019) but in nutshell it is because intention cannot be 
reduced to the features of fulfillment.  
Whereas for Kant “Our sensible and empirical intuition alone can provide them [concepts] 
with sense (Sinn) and significance (Bedeutung)” (Kant 1998: B149), for Husserl this is the 
intention which provides meaning (Bedeutung), and thus in order to validate a conceptual 
enterprise one should not depend only on its “safe” application or inner consistence; rather one 
should establish it by turning toward the transcendental intentionality. If formal logic were to get 
its authenticity from its application and from its being self-consistent, transcendental logic would 
have nothing to do with its constitution, but since, according to Husserl, this is not the case 
transcendental logic may take a normative standpoint toward formal, or general, logic.
19
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 For a clear explanation of the place of Besinnung for Husserl see (Hartimo 2020).  
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It is a matter of debate among Husserl scholars whether his transcendental approach would lead to a revisionist 
position with respect to sciences or remain conservative. For the reasons discussed above we side ourselves with 
 6 Conclusion 
Transcendental logic is the study of the origins of the constituents of formal reasoning. In this 
sense it is a two-sided study. It investigates ‘productive activities and habitualities’ functioning 
in reasoning as well as the patterns of inferences, ‘produced by activities and habitualities and 
afterwards persisting’. The subject matter of transcendental logic is the constitution of all kinds 
of formations, not only that of analytic judgments. The subject matter of general logic is analytic 
cognition. Therefore, in regard to the subject matter, general logic is subordinated to 
transcendental logic. On the other hand, general logic as containing the formal rules of reasoning 
is to apply in every domain of objectivity, whereas transcendental logic is not to apply in some 
places, and its proper domain is that of a priori cognition. So far Husserl and Kant could concur. 
The disagreement is that whereas for Kant general logic is complete and transcendental logic 
stands only in a descriptive position to it, for Husserl transcendental logic may take also a 
prescriptive position. By investigating the constitution of formal reasoning, transcendental logic, 
in the Husserlian sense of the term, will take a normative standpoint towards the formal logic(s) 
and it will put forward criteria for the accuracy of the formal logical systems.  
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